The difference between making it to the second round or falling by the wayside can be minimal, but the impact is enormous. The candidate who reaches second place has a strong chance of winning; the one who finishes third, even by an infinitesimal margin, sees their project ended.
Portuguese presidential elections are unusually uncertain, and everything suggests that there will be a second round. The high number of candidates, between 8 and 10, and the closeness in polling among four of them, with a fifth not far behind, create a fragmented scenario that defies any prediction. The difference between second and third place may be just a few tenths of a percentage point, which means that qualification for the second round will depend on details or chance: turnout on election day, the ability to capture tactical voting, the impact of a televised debate, or an unfavorable news story on the eve of the election.
This closeness between second and third place has profound consequences. The difference between making it to the second round or falling by the wayside can be minimal, but the impact is enormous. The candidate who reaches second place has a strong chance of winning; the one who finishes third, even by an infinitesimal margin, sees their project ended. That is why, in this context, each individual vote takes on unusual importance: it can literally be the vote that decides who remains in the race.
This fragile balance also affects how candidates position themselves. Whoever reaches the second round does not only face the challenge of winning new support; they also face the need to adjust their discourse depending on the opponent. If the runoff is between two candidates from the same political space, the contest will tend to radicalize subtle differences. If it is between candidates from different camps, the narrative will have to refocus on winning over the moderate electorate. The areas of confrontation do not need to be political; they may concern character, professional or political background, or even the image of the candidate and their immediate family. In any case, the second round becomes a game of strategic adaptation, where initial coherence may be sacrificed in the name of electoral victory.
It is precisely here that it is worth looking at the Irish model. In Ireland, the President is elected through the Single Transferable Vote. The voter does not simply choose a candidate; they rank them by preference. If their initial candidate has no chance, the vote is transferred to the second choice, and so on, until someone reaches an absolute majority. The system works as a sequential elimination from the bottom up: the least-supported candidates are removed, and the votes of their supporters are reused. Everything is resolved in a single day, although vote counting can sometimes be lengthy. By contrast, the Portuguese system simply accepts the two candidates with the most votes, supposedly the top first preferences, even if the difference between second and third is minimal.
In a simulation I conducted based on publicly released polls, a margin of a few tenths of a percentage point can decide who remains in the race (in my simulation, the difference ranged between 0.2 and 5 percentage points of valid votes cast). In the Irish system, by contrast, the opinions of voters who supported weaker candidates continue to count, because second and third preferences are considered. The result reflects not only who leads in first preferences, our first round, but who is able to assemble successive majorities throughout the process.
It is true that tactical or strategic voting exists in any system, but in the Irish model this tactical vote is more complex and does not prevent voters from supporting the candidate they like most in the first place, without fear of “wasting” their vote, because they know that their second or third option will still count. This reduces the pressure to abandon convictions in the name of immediate viability. Ultimately, voters have opinions about all the candidates, not just the first.
Portugal uses a two-round system, which has the advantage of simplicity, clarity, and tradition. It is, moreover, used in dozens of countries around the world, unlike the singularity of the Irish system. However, in a context of great fragmentation of opinions in society, such as the one we are experiencing, the Irish experience shows that there are alternatives capable of better reflecting the diversity of citizens’ preferences and of avoiding a situation in which a few tenths of a percentage point decide who gains access to the second round. The problem is not only Portuguese; the two-round system also turns French presidential elections into a lottery. Perhaps it is time to open the debate on how we want to choose our president in the future.
João Borges de Assunção, Professor at CATÓLICA-LISBON