CATÓLICA-LISBON

Protest leadership has a long historical background. They emerged during periods of crisis, oppression, or major social transformations, to challenge power, the prevailing social order, and to contest institutions. These are leaderships that position themselves outside traditional structures (although they may be institutionalized), with discourses of rupture and a strong capacity for social mobilization. History is filled with examples: the slave revolt led by Spartacus in Ancient Rome; Thomas Müntzer, the theologian of the revolution who headed the "Peasants’ War" in the 16th century; the struggles against absolutism and colonialism embodied by Robespierre and Simón Bolívar, are just a few among many others. These were struggles mobilized by peasant leaders, visionary prophets, radical patriots, or outraged citizens. 

With the industrial era came protest leadership against industrial capitalism and working conditions. Union struggles and revolutionary anarchism gained special prominence, represented by figures such as Emma Goldman and Louis Blanc. Today, protest leadership takes on multiple forms, supported by the media and social networks, associated with a variety of political, social, and environmental causes. They can be personalized, media-driven, and transient leaderships such as Alexei Navalny and Greta Thunberg, eccentric personalities like Beppe Grillo, party leaderships integrated into the system like Marine Le Pen, but also the discreet leadership of non-organic movements such as Priscillia Ludosky of the Yellow Vests. 

In the recent past, protest leadership was centered on trade union and radical left-wing movements that fought for better working conditions, against liberal capitalism, and social inequalities. In recent years, protest has shifted toward the far right and has grown, particularly in Europe, with the emergence of movements such as Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National, Alice Weidel’s Alternative for Germany, Matteo Salvini’s League in Italy, Herbert Kickl’s Freedom Party of Austria, Geert Wilders’ Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, Santiago Abascal’s Vox and Alvise Pérez’s Acabóse la Fiesta in Spain, and André Ventura’s Chega. Left-wing protest leadership has lost political relevance. According to data from the Authoritarian Populism Index 2024, the percentage of votes in Europe for far-left parties with parliamentary seats stood at 7.3 percent, while the far right reached 17.3 percent. 

These leaders channel popular dissatisfaction with the functioning of the political system, with traditional parties, and with the performance of liberal democracies. They propose alternatives that break with institutions and aim for the "purification" of the political system, returning to the direct expression of the people’s voice. They serve as a symbolic representation of indignation toward political institutions and their actors. They express collective nonconformity with the status quo, claim a strong moral authority, and base their influence on the emotional mobilization of public opinion. 

Despite many specificities, far-right protest leaderships share certain characteristics. They contest the institutions of liberal democracy, ideological labels, and the role of traditional media, proposing a moral refounding of politics and institutions. These are movements centered on the charismatic figure of the leader who employs a simple, direct, and polarizing discourse, with a clear distinction between the people, “us,” and the “others.” They have a high capacity for mobilization through impactful actions and narratives. They generate identification through the proximity of their language and bring into the public sphere the feelings of indignation experienced in the personal sphere. A strong presence on social networks promotes direct participation in debate and creates ‘closed opinion bubbles’ that heighten polarization. 

In these leaderships, connection with the base does not occur through traditional ideological frameworks, reformist strategies, or concrete action plans. It is established through identification with the experiences of the common citizen and through the resonance and amplification of feelings of revolt, injustice, abandonment, and moral decay. This is a direct and emotional relationship, supported by highly mobilizing “agitator flags.” 

The emotional connection with followers is based on three themes with profound existential meaning: indignation at the injustices of the political system and the moral crisis of the elites (loss of connection with the people and corruption), physical and psychological insecurity associated with social changes (immigration and demographic shifts), and the loss of cultural identity and traditional values (language, history, family, beliefs, and social morals). 

The fact that the connection to the support base is essentially emotional is the main reason why some of these leaders do not present comprehensive and detailed political programs that would be subject to the electorate’s verdict. The vague, ambiguous, or even contradictory nature of their discourse, often criticized, can be an advantage: it allows them to reach a broader set of voters, prevents them from being tied to specific commitments, enables them to position themselves with greater flexibility and timeliness in the dynamics of political life, reinforces the emotional dimension of communication, and at the same time allows them to be credited with unvalidated competencies. 

These leaderships are not inherently oriented toward governance but face a dilemma: to continue mobilizing protest around cause-based flags and risk losing credibility for not presenting solutions, or to assume programmatic commitments, join governments, and be evaluated by the electorate, running the risk of losing identity and emotional connection with their base. This is the price they may pay for moving from protest to responsibility. Does this dilemma make political protest leadership a transitory phenomenon? The coming period in Portugal will serve as a laboratory to test this thesis.