The world has not, yet, gone mad. It has simply become more multipolar. Those who fail to understand this are playing a game that belongs to the past.
Erratic decisions, broken alliances, economic conflicts between former partners, and a succession of contradictory narratives are not signs of disorientation. They are symptoms of a system in which power is no longer so concentrated and must be interpreted accordingly. Today, no one rules all the time, and everyone belongs to power poles. This fundamentally changes the logic of strategy.
This is where Business Warfare becomes a powerful analytical tool. In a more multipolar world, direct force has become costly, overly visible, and politically toxic. Recent experience shows that direct confrontation rarely resolves anything. On the contrary, it exposes, exhausts, and isolates. Those who insist on dominating in a multipolar system of interdependent actors quickly become the next target, whether regulatory, economic, media, or political.
Applying old tactics, such as imposing rules, forcing allies into alignment, or scaling power as if it ensured control, guarantees nothing. In multipolar environments, scale creates vulnerability, visibility attracts adversaries, and predictability invites the exploitation of weaknesses.
Since the end of the Cold War, we have lived in a form of permanent conflict in which economics, information, technology, and narrative have become central tools. Although weapons remain in the hands of the military, real power is increasingly exercised without them. This is where Machiavelli inevitably returns, as social media represents a truly Machiavellian invention. More than simple communication channels, they are genuine instruments of power and function because they tell audiences what they want to hear. They do not need to be true. They only need to be effective.
Machiavelli called this virtù: the ability to achieve objectives even at the expense of flexible morality. Surprising, isn’t it? In a multipolar world, where direct confrontation carries high costs, influence replaces brute force. Contemporary populism is therefore not a mere historical accident. It is a structural consequence of this very environment.
But influence alone is not enough. Before the occupation of symbolic space, there is always confrontation. This is where Sun Tzu becomes decisive. In a multipolar system, the first victory rarely targets the direct adversary. Instead, it targets their alliances in order to weaken them. What is striking today is not the collapse of alliances, since that has always been part of conflict, but seeing allies dismantle them from within.
Tariffs, sanctions, and trade wars between traditional partners quickly erode trust built over decades. Once trust is lost, the capacity to exert influence is also lost. Relationships become more unstable, louder, and more dangerous. This may be rational if a leader believes they gain more from the divorce, but by losing influence they also lose the ability to act in a Machiavellian way. The problem is that trust can be destroyed in days but takes generations to build. Leaders should therefore be aware that some paths have no return.
There is also a persistent misunderstanding between multipolarity and scale. Business Warfare shows that growth increases exposure and reduces degrees of freedom. Multipolarity favors those who keep options open, with strategic ambiguity and adaptive capacity. Some call this agility. It therefore favors those who become bridges, intermediaries, and translators between poles that, by definition, do not trust one another.
In a multipolar world, the real advantage lies not in dominating the board, but in controlling its points of articulation. Not in winning definitively, but in sustaining the tension of confrontation for longer and with less wear. Not in blind alignment, but in exploiting frictions without ever revealing the primary adversary.
In short, open confrontation is anything but Machiavellian. In a world where power is relational and temporary, absolute victory is a dangerous illusion. The most successful leaders will not necessarily be the strongest, but the most agile and adaptable. Not the most visible, but the most indispensable.
Perhaps this is the great irony of multipolarity: those who try to command emerge weakened, while those who learn to maneuver end up governing naturally.
Paulo Cardoso do Amaral, Professor at CATÓLICA-LISBON